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The ongoing negotiations in the WTO will most certainly lead to a further liberalization of the 
global agricultural trade. Related to this, many national governments, including Norway, 
Switzerland and Japan have placed substantial emphasis on the so-called non-trade concerns. In 
addition to the production of food and fiber, agriculture also provides or may provide national 
food security, environmental benefits, and viable rural areas. The term “Multifunctional 
Agriculture” has been applied to describe these additional functions. 
In this paper, we will show how the economic concepts of  “positive and negative externalities” 
and “public goods” can be used to analyse non-trade concerns and multifunctionality, especially 
with reference to agriculture’s impact on the environment. We conclude the paper with 
suggestions for international trade rules that can allow countries to meet domestic environmental 
policy objectives in a minimally trade-distorting manner.  
 
Keywords: Non-trade concerns, multifunctionality, externalities, public goods, cultural 
landscape, optimum subsidy, WTO 
 
Introduction 
The currently ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) will most certainly 
lead to a further liberalization of the global agricultural trade. These negotiations are based on 
Article 20 of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture, which states, inter alia, that the 
reform process is to be continued with the long-term objective of substantial and progressive 
reductions in the support and protection of the agricultural sector. A number of issues are to be 
taken into consideration in these negotiations, including the so-called non-trade concerns. The 
preamble of the Agreement defines non-trade concerns as; inter alia, food security and 
environmental protection. During the Uruguay Round, some countries also stressed the viability 
of rural areas as an important non-trade concern to be addressed in the reform process. 
Many national governments, including Norway, Switzerland and Japan, place substantial 
emphasis on these non-trade concerns, and have produced studies to support their arguments, and 
these studies have also been debated in the WTO. In particular, 38 countries submitted a note for 
the September 2000 meeting in the Agricultural Committee that includes their papers for a 
conference on non-trade concerns (WTO 2000). Non-trade concerns are also reflected in the 
negotiating proposals submitted by several WTO members. Lately, the fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar from 9 - 14 November 2001, confirmed “…that non-trade concerns  -    -  2
will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture” 
(WTO 2001). 
Agriculture provides or may provide more than just food and fiber – such as national food 
security, food safety, environmental benefits (cultural landscape, land conservation, biological 
diversity, recreation), cultural heritage, and viable rural areas. The terms “Multifunctional 
Agriculture” or “The European Model of Agriculture” are increasingly applied to describe these 
additional functions; especially the European Union, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Korea have 
put a lot of emphasis in this. This concept focuses on the fact that there are important links 
(jointness or complementary) between agricultural production (of the production of the private 
goods food and fiber) and the provision of these additional goods or services, and that functioning 
markets are lacking for these goods and services. The concept of multifunctionality has lately 
also become an important subject matter within the OECD (OECD 1998; OECD 2001).  
Although most countries in the WTO can accept the notion that agriculture in addition to the 
production of food and fiber may provide some other benefits to society, there are clear 
differences between countries in their opinion on what this should imply for the actual 
agricultural negotiations on further trade liberalisation within the WTO. One of the main 
questions debated in the WTO is whether “trade-distorting” subsidies, or subsidies outside the 
“green box”, are needed in order to help agriculture perform its many roles (i.e. to provide 
governments significant scope to pursue important “non-trade” concerns). The proponents of 
multifunctionality argue that there is a need for production-linked subsidies and that measures 
allowed within the “green box” will not be sufficient. 
In our view, the economic concepts of  “positive and negative externalities” and “public goods” 
should be used to analyse non-trade concerns and the multifunctionality of agriculture and to 
arrive at minimally trade-distorting policy in accordance with the prescriptions laid down in 
Article 20 of The Agreement on Agricultural. 
In this paper we will develop that conceptual framework, especially with reference to 
agriculture’s impact on the environment, after first having looked briefly into the concepts of 
externalities and public goods and some conflicting views between economists on agriculture’s 
environmental impacts. The paper concludes with suggestions for international trade rules that 
allow countries to meet domestic environmental policy objectives in a minimally trade-distorting 
manner. 
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The concepts of externalities and public goods and some conflicting 
views on agriculture’s environmental impacts 
Agricultural production activities can have both positive and negative impacts on the 
environment, i.e. can “produce” both positive and negative externalities. Many look upon the 
cultural landscape as a positive production externality, while pollution from agricultural 
production is seen as a negative external effect. Externalities often have the character of public 
goods defined by two characteristics: undepletability (consumption of a good by one person does 
not reduce the consumption available to anyone else) and non-excludability (once the good has 
been provided for one consumer, it is not possible to prevent other people from consuming it) 
(Baumol and Oates 1988, p. 18-19). The cultural landscape, for instance, confers benefits on all 
viewers of the landscape. At the same time, it is generally not possible to prevent people from 
appreciating an existing landscape (Hodge 1991, p. 180-181). Consequently, in a free market 
situation a positive externality/public good, as the cultural landscape, will be provided for below 
its optimum level; i.e. we will have a domestic distortion/a market failure
1.   
What do we mean by the phrase cultural landscape. According to Olsson and Rønningen (1999, 
p. 3), “The concept of cultural landscape goes back to the German Kulturlandschaft, meaning 
‘landscape formed or influenced by human activity’ ”. Olsson and Rønningen (1999, p. 3) 
continue by stating that: “Within English speaking countries, ‘countryside’ is the term normally 
used for the agricultural landscape. However, recently it seems that the term ‘cultural landscape’ 
has also become more frequently used within Britain.”   
Hovorka (1997) quotes a definition of cultural landscape as applied in Austrian research: “The 
cultural landscape is a perceived unity of the spatially effective fabric of natural conditions and 
human influences. Cultural landscapes develop and change over time as a result of the interplay 
of socio-economic, cultural and natural factors.” Hovorka continues: “The cultural landscape can 
thus in no way be conceived as a static entity but rather as an expression of ecological, cultural 
and socio-economic development and change in living and working space. … [It] can only be 
understood as a process.” According to the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (1992) the 
agrarian cultural landscape includes “…areas under the influence of past and present farming 
activities – arable and surface cultivated land, pastures and grazing land with associated forest 
and field edges and residual areas. This includes intensively farmed areas, both small and large-
scale, extensively cultivated areas, as well as abandoned and overgrown areas.” Other definitions 
also emphasise that the cultural landscape includes productive farming areas, associated semi-
natural areas, remnants of natural habitats, cultural monuments, and areas that used to be 
farmland, but are now starting to become overgrown (Daugstad & Jones 1994). 
As an example hereof, the Norwegian cultural landscape, reflecting topographical and climatic 
conditions and closely related production structures, is remarkably varied (Nersten et al. 1999, p. 
                                                 
1 Gravelle and Rees (1986, p. 13) put forward that many economists have seen cases of market failure as a legitimate 
basis for governmental policy (for interventions), which goes beyond that of providing the legal infrastructure for the 
economy. The literature on market failure can be cast in the rigorous tradition of Arrow and Debreu, and include 
propositions suggesting that policy can be Pareto enhancing (Alves et al. 1991, p. 197). In the tradition of Pigou the 
government is seen as an omniscient, benevolent dictator, which intervenes in the economy to correct market failures 
(McCormick and Tollison 1981).  
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66). It varies from small-scale coastal farms squeezed between the sea and the rocky coastal 
terrain with shapes and sizes of fields dictated by the natural conditions to larger-scale farms, 
varying from open plains to low-lying valleys. In other areas, the cultural landscape includes 
small, scattered fields in rugged, hilly forests in the fjord districts and the peaceful, pastoral 
landscapes of the inland valleys. Despite the legacy of several thousand years of farming and a 
much shorter period of generous subsidies, only three percent of the area of Norway is used for 
agricultural production.  
The need to preserve cultural landscapes is widely recognized in Norway, Europe, and many 
other countries; in contrast, it is not an important element of agricultural and rural policy in 
countries with large areas of arable land. Ian Hodge provides a useful interpretation to reconcile 
the contrasting views and policy prescriptions of agricultural economists. To do so, he contrasts 
two alternative models or perspectives of the way “in which the issue of rural environmental 
values is assumed to enter into agricultural policy analysis” (Hodge 2000, p. 264). The first 
alternative, which he terms the “input model”, is favoured by North American and Australian 
agricultural economists. The second alternative, which he called the “output model”, is favoured 
by many European and Japanese economists.  
The first, “input model” postulates an “inevitable and clear relationship between output prices 
and environmental quality” and that “a reduction in the level of price support inevitably leads to a 
reduced intensity of production and thus to an improvement in environmental quality” (Hodge 
2000, p. 264). The second although not necessarily conflicting model, “emphasises marketed 
food and environmental quality as separate products of the land (…). These are often seen as 
joint products that can be produced in varying combinations” (Hodge 2000, p. 264). Agricultural 
economists in large, predominately exporting countries, often point to increased level of fertilizer 
and pesticide use that accompanies increased agricultural production and argue that a 
rationalization of price policies leads to an improvement in the environment. In contrast, 
agricultural economists in small, often importing countries point to the provision of a cultural, 
landscape, and other amenities arising from agricultural production. These two views of the 
world and the conflicting 
policy prescriptions are 
reconciled, to some extent, 
by the discussion below.  
A version of the diagram 
offered by Hodge to show 
the compatibility of the 
two models is shown in 
Figure 1. The vertical axis 
measures the level of 
broadly defined 
countryside services, that 
is meant to capture such 
services as environmental 
quality and cultural 
landscape; the horizontal 
axis measures the level of 
agricultural output. Hodge 
P 




based on a comp-
limentary relationship 
between agricultural 













































































Figure 1. Production possibilities illustrating the “input” and 
“output” models  -    -  5
(2000, p. 267) argues that at lower, less intensive levels of agricultural output countryside 
services and agricultural output are complementary; while at higher, more intense levels, they are 
competitive. The production possibilities frontier (PP) illustrates such a relationship. Hodge 
argues that the “input model” captures the production and environmental trade-off on the segment 
of the curve with a competitive relationship. Increases in output are associated with increased 
environmental costs or a decrease in the services provided by the countryside. In turn, increases 
in agricultural output at lower levels of output increase the flow of countryside services. 
Economists following the “input model” predict degradation in the environment if agricultural 
policies lead to increased prices and 
production. Conversely, economists 
favouring the “output model” can 
rationalize an increase in environmental 
quality arising from policies leading to 
increased agricultural output. So, the 
same policy prescription leads to 
markedly different outcomes.  
The conflicting predictions are 
illustrated in Figure 2 (Figure 2 is based 
on Romstad (1999, p. 15), but is slightly 
modified). The central panel shows the 
perfectly competitive market 
equilibrium and the corresponding level 
of environmental quality (countryside 
services) in the upper panel, the “output 
model”, and the lower panel, the “input 
model”. A price subsidy leading to an 
increase in agricultural production also 
leads to an increase in environmental 
quality in the “output model”. In 
contrast, it leads to a decline in 
countryside services or environmental 
quality in the lower panel depicting the 
“input model”. In the next section we 
translate these outcomes into a partial 
equilibrium trade model that allows us 
to identify agricultural policies, which 
allow nations to preserve the cultural 




































































Figure 2.  Illustration of the environmental outcomes in 
the “input” and “output models”.  -    -  6
 
Conceptual Framework 
We treat this issue in the 
partial equilibrium supply-
demand framework often 
used in analysing trade 
impacts of domestic policies 
as illustrated in Figure 3 (and 
in Figure 4). At low levels of 
output (intensity) agricultural 
output and environmental 
services are complementary, 
which is shown as a positive 
externality. The marginal, 
social cost of agricultural 
production lies below the 
marginal, private cost of 
agricultural production.  
Beyond some price level of 
agricultural output, the 
intensity of agricultural 
production increases until 
further output reduces the 
level of countryside services or 
the quality of the environment.  
Beyond this reference level, 
agricultural production creates a negative externality that considered when determining the 
optimum policy and level of agricultural production. Agricultural economists in North America,  
Australia and New Zealand promote the “polluter pays” principle and the levying of taxes to 
correct for negative externalities and environmental pollution. The agricultural economists have 
been less keen when proposing policies to produce the optimum level of a positive externality, 
and for a good reason; agricultural activities in those countries are not perceived to produce a 
positive externality, such as a cultural landscape. However, in the case of externalities/public 
goods there will be a domestic distortion/market failure. Pigou suggested already in the 1920s the 
use of taxes on negative external effects and subsidies on positive external effects to correct 
allocative distortions.  
Bhagwati (1971, p. 76-80) and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1998, p. 86-87) “confirms” Pigou’s 
view that in case of a domestic market distortion caused by a pure production externality the first 
best policy will be an optimum production subsidy (or an equivalent tax-cum-subsidy). The 
second best policy will be either tariff (trade subsidy) or factor tax-cum-subsidies (both are 
superior to laissez-faire but can not be ranked uniquely vis-à-vis each other). Corden (1997, p. 7-
9) also argue that a price subsidy will be an optimum policy in case of a domestic 
distortion/divergence caused by a positive production externality. However, Corden (1997, p. 33) 
argues that this result is based on the four assumptions of the theory of domestic divergence. (1) 
Subsidies can be financed by “nondistorting” taxes. (2) Taxation involves no collection costs.    
 
Figure 3. Representation of the “input” and “output” models as 
positive and negative externalities 
As production increases,  
environment and  
production become  
competitive rather than  
complementary.    
Q  
P   
Marginal   
Private    
Cost    
Marginal  
Private and  
Social Cost    
Price 
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(3) There are no costs of disbursement of subsidies. (4) The income distribution effects of various 
policies (such as the redistribution from taxpayers to subsidy recipients) can be neglected. In 
Corden (1997) each of these assumptions is considered. The conclusions are that though the 
analysis has to be modified, the central argument is unshaken by the removal of assumptions (1) 
and (4). Removal of assumption (2) will slightly dent it, while removal of assumption (3) will 
affect it (a tariff may be first-best policy) (Corden 1997, p. 33). However, Corden (1997, p. 39) 
also concludes that in developed countries subsidy disbursement costs are unlikely to be high.  
It follows from Bhagwati (1971), Bhagwati and Ramasawami (1998) and Corden (1997) that a 
simple rejection of the possible use of a production subsidy as a corrective measure in case of a 
domestic market distortion caused by positive agricultural production externalities (which in 
principle is done in the WTO since a price subsidy is not allowed within the existing “green 
box”), is not consistent with economic (trade) theory. It is also worth noting that the question of 
possible trade-distortion of such price interventions in domestic markets is not mentioned at all 
by Bhagwati (1971), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1998) or Corden (1997), while it is a major 
issue within the WTO. Presumably, that reflects that this issue has more to do with political 
economy (and international politics) than with trade theory in itself. However, Burrell (2001, p. 
13) writes: “On the question of weather it actually make sense for corrective policies to be 
minimally distorting, Blandford (2001, p.52) observes that in the presence of an unmarketable 
externality, the market is already distorted. If direct payments are made to farmers to correct for 
market failure and to remunerate externalities, it is hardly logical to require that they should have 
no effect on production and trade. This discussion highlights the need for a better definition of a 
minimally distorting policy. If the distortion is measured against a “first-best” situation, it 
generally involves reference to market supply and demand functions that can only be discovered 
econometrically, and hence can always be disputed. Alternatively, if the change in production is 
measured against the current (distorted) level, why should it be zero?” We agree with Burrell in 
this view, and will come back to this issue in our concluding remarks.  
In the standard, normative trade theory the neo-classical economic theory of a society is 
expanded to the international world. Corden (1984, p. 69) writes: “The central proposition of 
normative trade theory is that there are gains from trade and, more specifically, that given certain 
assumptions not only is free trade Pareto-superior to autarky but it is also Pareto-efficient, being 
superior to various degrees of trade restriction”. According to MacLaren (1991) this proposition 
provides the intellectual basis for the case in favour of moves towards freer trade and against that 
of protectionism in agriculture. But, he emphasises that this theory applies only to the “small” 
country, which cannot influence its external terms of trade
2.  
In Figure 4, we illustrate the opening of an economy to free trade while simultaneously adopting 
an optimum environmental policy to correct for externalities. The diagram depicts the “output 
model”, that is countryside services, or the cultural landscape, as a joint product of agricultural 
production. In the domestic market, the marginal private cost of agricultural production is shown 
as the S(MPC) curve, while that adjusted for the positive externality is shown as the marginal 
                                                 
2 For “large” countries free trade is not the optimal policy: the restriction of imports or exports by a border tax is the 
optimal trade policy to pursue in the presence of perfect competition domestically and in the absence of foreign 
retaliation (MacLaren 1991).  
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social cost curve S(MSC). Because we are dealing with a positive externality, the marginal social 
cost lies below the marginal, private cost. The autarky, no trade, equilibrium quantity is indicated 
by Qa, and the equilibrium supply-and-demand price is Pa . 
The relevant excess demand curve is that derived as the difference between the demand curve and 
the marginal social cost curve (MSC) and is indicated in the trade sector by the curve labelled 
ED(MSC). (The excess demand curve without the subsidy policy is shown for reference only as 
ED(MPC).) The export supply of this product is indicated by the ES curve. Opening the economy 
to trade, results in the equilibrium world market price shown as Pw, which is found where excess 




Demand expands to Qd,t with the fall in the demand price to Pw . The optimum subsidy policy 
equates net social cost (S(MSC)) with the marginal benefit (the world price), which occurs at a 
level of output of Qs,t and a supply price of Ps,t. The optimum (per unit) subsidy is the difference 
between the world market price and the supply price. 
The analysis of welfare losses is similar to that from trade liberalization without an externality.  




















Figure 4.  Illustration of trade liberalization and adoption of any optimum environmental 
policy.  -    -  9
price, and bounded by the demand curve and the vertical axis. The producer loss is indicated by 
the trapezoid lying between the autarky price and the new supply price and bounded by the price 
axis and the private supply curve. The subsidy is indicated by the rectangle identified above. The 
additional loss that must be considered is the reduction in the positive externality, measured by 
the trapezoid lying between the two supply curves and bounded by the autarky level of supply 
and that obtained with free trade. The nation is better off with this subsidy policy than simply 
opening its markets to trade and ignoring the potential benefits of the positive externality/public 
good.  
The exporting country gains from the liberalization of trade, but not as much as it would gain if 
the importing country did not subsidize production. Clearly, however, world welfare is 
maximised when the importing country employs the optimum subsidy policy. 
Farmers in the importing country, however, may lobby for additional income support. The reason 
is that opening the economy to trade eliminates the economic rents received through market price 
support. This is the area bounded by the pre-trade consumer price, Pd,a, the world market price, 
Pw, and the pre-trade consumption and production quantity. Rules to prevent this unwarranted 
rent seeking are discussed in the final section of this paper.  
Policymakers in many nations have considered optimum subsidy policies for environmental 
reasons only in passing because large income transfers were made to farmers through market 
price support. The issue within the WTO context should be the reinstrumentation of that market 
price support to optimum environmental subsidies. If national governments still want to give 
farmers income support for some income redistribute reasons or otherwise, such support should 
be given as direct pure income support/or tax reduction, as decoupled support, and not linked to 
agricultural production activities at all. However, surely the environmental subsidies (in addition 
to world agricultural market prices) must be high enough to give farmers an economic incentive 
to provide the external benefits/public goods (i.e. to give farmers some income opportunities).   
In the analysis above we have referred to the optimum subsidy as a production subsidy (linked to 
agricultural output). Depending on the actual degree of jointness (or complementary) between 
agricultural production and the positive externality/the public good in question, the optimum 
subsidy may be a subsidy on output (possibly also a regionalized price subsidy), but it may also 
be a subsidy linked to factors of production or otherwise linked to agricultural production 
processes. However, a central part in our analysis is that the optimum environmental subsidy (in 
case of jointness) will have to be a production related subsidy, and that so-called decoupled 
support within the “green box” will not be sufficient. In relation to the provision of the cultural 
landscape, the optimum subsidy may then be budget price support for agricultural production, or 
some kind of acreage support or a combination of budget price support and acreage support. 
Possibly, it may also be optimal to support directly special features in the agricultural landscape 
that are valued (for example headage support for grazing animals). In deciding which policies 
(measures) to use, we have to keep in mind that there will always be a trade-off between 
precision and transaction costs regarding any policy (i.e. costs of information gathering, decision 
making, contract formulation, controlling, etc.). The problem encountered here is to find a 
balance between precision and transaction costs (Vatn 1998). Taking this into consideration, in 
some cases the simple solution from an administrative perspective – production support – may be 
targeted enough. The loss in precision is less than the gain in (reduced) transaction costs 
compared to alternatives (Vatn 1999, p. 12).    -    -  10
A pragmatic approach to trade rules 
Clearly, policies to obtain the production of the optimum quantity of cultural landscape or other 
countryside services must distort trade to some degree. In many cases these subsidies are tied to 
participation in production activities and production of agricultural products. We argue, however, 
that just as a pollution tax is widely accepted as the optimum policy for a negative externality, so 
should the use of a production-tied subsidy be accepted as optimum policy for a positive 
externality. The rub is, of course, that while pollution taxes decrease production and either 
increase imports or decrease exports, either outcome could be pleasing to the nation’s trading 
partners; a subsidy to obtain the optimal amount of a positive externality will likely have the 
opposite effect. 
Providing subsidies for production of positive externalities, moreover, is complicated and may be 
costly. In our view, sovereign nations have a right to undertake those policies, however costly to 
national budgets. From another perspective, it is foolish to undertake those policies that secure 
the production of positive externalities free of trade reprisals. Of course to do so requires the 
development of carefully specified international rules to prevent such policies from becoming a 
form of protectionism. An essential element of our approach, and the first of our proposed rules, 
is that nations cannot subsidize exports or place import tariffs on any agricultural and food 
products. As shown in Figure 4, this results in an expansion of consumption and imports for 
trading partners. 
But, the level of optimum subsidy and associated level of output after trade are not known. A 
nation could respond to producer pressure and introduce subsidies giving rise to a level of output 
equal to the level of consumption at the free trade price. However, limiting the quantity supported 
to the current level of output, or to some proportion of the current level, would allow the nation to 
meet its objectives for positive externalities like the cultural landscape, and would mean that the 
increase in consumption must necessarily result in increased imports. 
The second condition, in addition to the elimination of border measures, requires a reformulation 
of “green” and “blue box” criteria. “Green box” criteria would need to explicitly include 
production-tied supports that meet certain carefully prescribed requirements. The proposed 
changes would simply mean a transfer of some support from the “blue” to the “green box”. 
Nations will probably reinstate some of the “amber box” support that vanishes with the 
elimination of border measures, to “green box” support to continue the provision of cultural 
landscape and other countryside services. 
The position of the Cairns Group, and of the United States in the previous rounds, to treat 
agriculture no differently than any other sector, and so subject to general WTO rules, will simply 
result in a protracted negotiation that arrives at a minimal agreement with a maximum amount of 
acrimony. Our proposal to eliminate export subsidies and border measures and to change the 
“green box” criteria to allow tightly prescribed, but production related and so trade distorting, 
subsidies provides a way forward. 
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